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Abstract
At first glance, the world would be a better place if all the people had
positive attitude towards each other. It is known that this is not always
the case: sometimes, the excess of positive attitude can lead to negative consequences. In this paper, we show that, vice versa, a reasonable
amount of negative attitude can make life better for everyone. What is
therefore needed is not the exclusive appearance of positive attitude, but
rather a balance – titled towards moderately positive attitude.

1

How to Take Attitude into Account When Describing Human Behavior

How to describe human behavior. According to decision theory, a rational
(i.e., consistent) human decision maker should select an alternative with the
largest possible value of expected utility u; see, e.g., [5, 9, 10, 12, 16].
How to take attitude into account. Usually, it is assumed that the utility
of a person depends only on this person’s gains and losses. However, in real life,
the person’s preferences also take into account gains and losses of others. If a
person A has a positive attitude towards a person B, then B’s happiness (and
high utility values) increases A’s utility as well. On the other hand, if a person
A has a negative attitude towards a person C, then C’s happiness makes the
person A less happy (i.e., decreases A’s utility value).
The idea that a utility of a person depends on utilities of others was ﬁrst
described in [14, 15]. It was further developed by a future Nobelist Gary Becker;
see, e.g., [1]; see also [3, 6, 7, 17].
(0)
In general, the utility ui of i-th person can be described as ui = fi (ui , uj ),
(0)
where ui is the utility that does not take other people into account, and uj
are utilities of other people.
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This dependence is usually small, so we expand it into Taylor series and keep
only the linear terms of this expansion. In this case, the utility ui of i-th person
is equal to
∑
(0)
ui = ui +
αij · uj ,
j̸=i

where each coeﬃcient aij describes the i-th person’s attitude towards the j-th
one.
Excessive positive attitude can make people unhappy: a known fact.
At ﬁrst glance, life would be perfect if everyone has very positive attitude towards each other. Alas, a simple analysis shows that excessive positiveness can
be harmful [2, 4, 8, 12].
Let us start with the case of mutual positive attitude between persons P1
and P2 , meaning that α12 > 0 and α21 > 0. In this case, we have
(0)

u1 = u1 + α12 · u2 ;
(0)

u2 = u2 + α21 · u1 .
(0)

(0)

Once we know the original utility values u1 and u2 , we can solve this system
of linear equations and ﬁnd the resulting values of utility:
(0)

(0)

(0)

(0)

u1 =

u1 + α12 · u2
;
1 − α12 · α21

u2 =

u2 + α21 · u1
.
1 − α12 · α21

As a result, when we have excessive positive attitude, e.g., when we have α12 > 1
(0)
and α21 > 1, then positive original pleasures ui > 0 lead to ui < 0 – i.e., to
unhappiness.
According to [2, 4, 8, 12], this phenomenon may be one of the reasons why
people in love often experience deep negative emotions.
If we consider n > 2 persons, then even less excessive positive attitude can
lead to negative emotions. Let us illustrate this on a simple case when we
everyone has the same positive attitude α > 0 towards each other, and when
(0)
the original utilities are the same: ui = u(0) > 0. In this case, the actual
utility u of each person is determined by the equation
∑
(0)
ui = ui + α ·
uj ,
j̸=i

i.e., in this case,
u = u(0) + α · (n − 1) · u.
Thus, here,
u=

u(0)
,
1 − α · (n − 1)
2

and is, thus, negative when α >

1
.
n−1

What we do in this paper. The above examples show that excessive (or even
not so excessive) positive attitude can make people unhappy. In this paper, we
show that, vice versa, negative attitude can make people happier.
This may be the evolutionary reason for negative attitude?
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Positive Consequences of Negative Attitude:
Two Examples

First example: negative attitude helps to decrease the negative eﬀect
of excessive positive attitude. Let us consider a simple case of a person
P0 in the presence of two “saints” P1 and P2 with excessive positive attitude
towards everyone: α12 = α10 = α21 = α20 = α > 1. Let us also assume that the
(0)
(0)
(0)
(0)
original utilities are the same for all three persons: u0 = u1 = u2 = u0 .
We already know that if P0 will also have excessive positive attitude towards
everyone, all three will turn out to be unhappy. What attitude β should we
recommend to P0 towards P1 and P2 so that at least this person will be happy?
(0)
Of course, we can recommend β = 0, this will guarantee that u0 = u0 > 0,
but can we do better? Let us analyze the problem. Here, since we assume P1
and P2 to be similar, their utilities are equal, so u1 = u2 . Thus, we have
u0 = u(0) + 2β · u1 ;
u1 = u(0) + α · u0 + α · u1 .
From the second equation, we conclude that u1 · (1 − α) = u(0) + α · u0 , so
u1 =

1
α
· u(0) +
· u0 .
1−α
1−α

Substituting this expression into the ﬁrst equation, we conclude that
u0 = u(0) +

2β
2α · β
· u(0) +
· u0 .
1−α
1−α

By moving all the terms containing u0 into one side and all the terms containing
u(0) into the other side, we get
(
)
(
)
2α · β
2β
(0)
u0 · 1 −
=u · 1+
,
1−α
1−α
hence

2β
1 − α · u(0) .
u0 =
2α · β
1−
1−α
1+

3

To check how changing β from β = 0 will aﬀect this utility value, let us compute
the derivative of this value with respect to β when β = 0. This derivative is
equal to
du0
2β
2α · β
2 · (1 + α) · β
=
+
=
.
dβ
1−α
1−α
1−α
When α > 1, this derivative is negative, so decreasing β below 0 – i.e., adapting
a negative attitude – indeed makes P0 happier.
So, in this example, a negative attitude makes P0 happier.
Second example: negative attitude enhances fairness. Another example
refers to joint decision making. In 1950, another future Nobelist John Nash
showed that under reasonable assumptions like symmetry, independence from
irrelevant alternatives, and scale invariance (i.e., invariance under replacing
the original utility function ui (A) with an equivalent function a · ui (A)), the
only appropriate group decision rule is selecting an alternative A for which the
n
∏
product
ui (A) is the largest possible [11]; see also [9, 10, 12, 13].
i=1

Here, the utility functions must be scaled in such a way that the “status
quo” situation A(0) is assigned the utility 0. This re-scaling can be achieved,
def
e.g., by replacing the original utility values ui (A) with re-scaled values u′i (A) =
ui (A) − ui (A(0) ).
When we maximize the product, there is no guarantee that the solution will
be in any sense fair, i.e., that in some sense, the resulting utilities will be close
to each other. However, if we consider the case when the two participants have
some negative feelings towards each other, then we get some fairness. Indeed,
(0)
in this case, the utility of the ﬁrst person is u1 = u1 − |α12 | · u2 , and the utility
(0)
of the second person is u2 = u2 − |α21 | · u1 , for some |αij | ∈ (0, 1).
In this case, the above formulas imply that
u1 =
and

(0)

(0)

(0)

(0)

u1 − |α12 | · u2
1 − α12 · α21

u2 − |α21 | · u1
.
1 − α12 · α21
A joint decision requires that both sides agree, and for both to agree, each
participant’s utility should be larger than (or at least equal to) the status-quo
utility 0. Thus, in any joint decision, we will have u1 ≥ 0 and u2 ≥ 0, hence
(0)
(0)
(0)
(0)
(0)
u1 ≥ |α12 | · u2 and u2 ≥ |α21 | · u1 . So, the ratio between the gains ui
cannot be very much diﬀerent from 1:
u2 =

(0)

|α21 | ≤

u2

(0)
u1

≤

1
.
|α12 |

The more negative is the mutual attitude, the more restrictive this condition –
(0)
and in the limit when |α12 | and |α21 | tend to 1, we get perfect equality u1 =
(0)
u2 .
4

So, in this example too, negative attitude leads to positive consequences.
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